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1 Introduction
Singapore celebrates its National Day on 9 August, and every year, about 60,000
tickets for the National Day Celebrations — which include a parade, musical performances
and fireworks — are distributed free, on a first-come, first-served basis. As the date and
venues of the distribution were announced in advance, this led to queues forming days
before the distribution date as eager Singaporeans took leave from work to wait in line.1
Many Singaporeans felt that the queuing system was inequitable and ineﬃcient, and a
lottery system would be the fairest and most eﬃcient way to allocate the tickets. After all,
the allocation of tickets by lottery to attend mass events is widely practiced around the
world. For instance, in the United States, a portion of the tickets to attend each game of
the SuperBowl series of American football is distributed via a lottery among season-ticket
holders of the two competing teams. Others have suggested that auctioning the tickets
would be a better system as the tickets will go to individuals who value them most, and the
proceeds could be channeled for charitable purposes.2 The National Day tickets are highly-
prized; an active market for National Day tickets exists, and tickets were being oﬀered for
sale on the Internet, at up to 500 Singapore dollars per ticket!
What is the appropriate mechanism for allocating the National Day tickets: a lottery,
a queue or a market auction? Under what circumstances will one allocation mechanism
be preferred over another mechanism?3 The choice of an optimal non-price allocation
mechanism is significant in a wide variety of economic contexts, such as the allocation of
subsidized public housing or the award of oil drilling leases. In many countries, the provision
of public goods and services is often subject to price and quantity controls, which, in turn,
necessitates the use of non-price mechanisms to allocate the scarce resources.
In our introductory example, a market auction of the National Day tickets is potentially
lucrative, as the potential revenue is likely to substantially higher than the administrative
cost of holding the auction. However, commercialization of the National Day celebrations is
politically unacceptable. Theoretically, if administrative cost is negligible, a market auction
oﬀers the most eﬃcient allocation and the auction revenue can be re-distributed, so that
social welfare is preserved and possibly enhanced. Thus, under ideal circumstances, there
need not be a tradeoﬀ between eﬃciency and equity. In general, when the value of the
1It was reported in the press that some individuals had queued for as long as 35 hours to obtain a pair
of tickets. See “Cut out the queues, ballot for National Day Parade tickets,”The Straits Times July 9, 2002.
2Singapore already has the distinction of being the only country in the world to hold a monthly auction
of car licenses that allow car owners to keep their cars for 10 years. Since the vehicle quota system was
introduced in April 1990, the Singapore government receives proceeds of approximately one billion Singapore
dollars annually from the car license auctions as contribution to its Consolidated Fund.
3There have also been suggestions to allocate a portion of the tickets by merit, according to a set of
criteria measuring an individual’s contribution to community service.
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objects to be allocated are significant (either private utilities or potential profits), so that
allocative eﬃciency is important, a market auction is the optimal allocation mechanism.
Thus, car licenses, residential land plots and band spectrum are allocated through market
auctions. If an auction is not feasible, due to either economic or political reasons, two
commonly used non-price mechanisms are the lottery and the waiting-line auction. A
lottery is a random allocation to interested individuals while a first-come first-served queue
system is akin to a waiting-line auction, where participants compete by choosing the optimal
time to arrive at the queue, which then determines their expected probabilities of getting
an allocation.
There are many examples of resources being allocated through a lottery system; these
include hunting permits, immigrant visas, admission to schools and universities, rights to
fishing berths and oil drilling leases. In some countries, economic burdens, such as military
draft and jury duty are also decided by lottery.4 Publicly provided resources that have been
allocated through a queue system include subsidized medical care, recreational facilities and
public housing. In some instances, participation in the waiting-line auction or in the lottery
is conditional on a pre-selection based on merit — i.e. the participants must meet certain
criteria in order to be eligible to compete.
There are two aspects of an allocation mechanism to consider: allocative eﬃciency and
equity. The eﬃciency of a mechanism is measured by the degree of rent dissipation, which
comprises resource misallocation and rent seeking costs. Resource misallocation occurs when
individuals who succeed in obtaining an allocation are not be the ones who value the objects
most. In the case of the lottery, the likelihood of a correct allocation is inversely proportional
to the number of participants, while in the case of the waiting-line auction, the individuals
who queued up earlier may be the ones with lower opportunity cost of time rather than the
ones with higher monetary valuations. The other source of rent dissipation is rent-seeking
costs. For instance, waiting in line creates disutility as well as potential loss in income. If
there is pre-selection for participation in a lottery, or if the probability of allocation can be
influenced, rent-seeking behavior may emerge even in a lottery allocation scheme.
The equity of an allocation mechanism is measured by the welfare impact of the alloca-
tion outcome, according to a social welfare function. The choice of one allocation mechanism
over another often necessitates a tradeoﬀ between eﬃciency and equity.5 The preference for
the lottery to allocate economic goods (and burdens) is frequently made on the grounds of
horizontal equity, i.e. individuals who possess the same relevant characteristics or qualities
should be treated equally. In the context of optimal taxation policy, Stiglitz (1982) has
4One could perhaps attempt to avoid being allocated an economic burden; for instance, by disqualifying
oneself through a medical condition in the case of a military draft, or making oneself unsuitable for jury
duty.
5See Elster (1991) for a discussion of this issue.
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shown that a small degree of randomization in tax rates can improve welfare. If transfer-
ability is feasible and not prohibited, a lottery can potentially attain first-best allocative
eﬃciency, albeit with a re-distribution of social surplus to lucky winners in the lottery. How-
ever, this may give rise to potential rent-seeking behavior, thereby reducing the eﬃciency
of the lottery. Boyce (1994) has argued that lottery participation fees and restrictions on
transferability may improve the relative eﬃciency of the lottery, as these measures reduce
rent-seeking behavior. The same argument can be made for rationing goods through a
waiting-line auction, as transferability alters the incentives of participation and the optimal
strategy, as noted in Sah (1987).
Although there is an extensive literature (see Section 1.1) on the properties of diﬀerent
non-price allocation mechanisms, relatively little work has been carried out to compare the
allocative eﬃciency of the lottery versus the waiting-line auction. While it is recognized
that the eﬃciency and desirability of the lottery versus the waiting-line auction depends on
the specific circumstances under consideration, there is no general theoretical results, thus
far, to delineate the circumstances under which one mechanism would dominate the other.
Furthermore, it is also not clear which are the key factors determining the relative eﬃciency
of the two mechanisms, and what is the impact on relative eﬃciency when valuations and
time costs are correlated. In a related paper, Taylor, Tsui and Zhu (2001) studied this
issue and provided a set of initial results on the relative eﬃciency of the two allocation
mechanisms. Using numerical analysis, they also considered the local impact of mean-
preserving dispersions in valuations on relative allocative eﬃciency. Our motivation for the
present paper is to attempt a more general analysis of the relative allocative eﬃciency of
the two mechanisms.
We investigate this problem for the cases where consumers possess identical time costs
(the homogeneous case), and where time costs are correlated with time valuations (the
heterogeneous case).Our approach is as follows. For the case where consumers possess iden-
tical time costs (the homogeneous case), we derive general analytical expressions for the
expected social surplus functions under the assumption that the time valuation follows a
power function distribution, a Weibull distribution, a logistic distribution, a beta distri-
bution, etc. These distributions are chosen for our study as they cover all the potential
situations of practical interest.6 The set of analytical results allows us to draw the following
general conclusions: (i) the shape of the distribution of time valuations and the scarcity
6The type of distributions covered in terms of the shape of their density functions include uniform
(consumer valuations on the objects are equally distributed), L-shaped (majority of consumers with very
low valuations and a few with very high valuations), U-shaped (most consumers have either very high or
very low valuations, with a few in between), J-shaped (majority of consumers with high valuations and a
few low valuations), unimodal or hump-shaped (most consumers have valuations in the middle, with a few
having low or high valuations).
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factor (measured by the ratio of number of objects over number of participants) are the two
key factors in determining the relative eﬃciency of the two mechanisms, and (ii) the lottery
generally dominates the waiting-line auction unless the distribution of time valuations is
extremely skewed (L-shaped), so that there are relatively few participants possessing high
valuations, and the scarcity factor is suﬃciently high.
We extend the analysis to the case where consumers are heterogenous in their time
costs. We study a model where time costs and time valuations are correlated, and show
that the relative eﬃciency of the waiting-line auction improves when there is a positive
correlation between time costs and time valuations, but deteriorates when the correlation
is negative. However, the improvement in the allocative eﬃciency of the waiting-line auc-
tion is not suﬃcient to alter the overall dominance of the lottery. When time costs and
valuations are independent, the results for the case of homogeneous time costs continue to
hold. The generality of our results suggests that introducing an element of randomization
in the allocation process may help to improve the allocative eﬃciency in a wide variety of
rent-seeking situations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We briefly review some of the related
literature in Section 1.1. Section 2 presents the basic analytics of the two allocation mech-
anisms. Section 3 compares eﬃciencies of the two mechanisms for the case of homogenous
consumers under various distributional assumptions for time valuations. Section 4 extends
the analysis to the case of heterogenous consumers. Section 5 concludes the paper.
1.1 Related literature
One of the early papers to study the issue of allocative eﬃciency is Oi (1967), who inves-
tigated the economic cost of the military draft lottery due to the misallocation of resources.
Several authors (Eckhoﬀ (1989) and Goodwin (1992)) have examined the desirability of the
lottery from an horizontal equity perspective, arguing that lotteries represent a fair means
to allocate resources, as everyone has the same probability of winning, regardless of the
characteristics or qualities that one possess. Boyce (1994) examined both the eﬃciency and
equity of the lottery system; his results suggest that the lottery is a dominant allocation
mechanism when the proportion of redistributable social surplus is small. An early survey
on the theory of rationing was provided by Tobin (1952). The economics of the queue
system in rationing goods was analyzed by Nicholas, Smolensky and Tideman (1971) and
Barzel (1974). The issue of heterogeneity was taken up in Suen (1989), who analyzed the
eﬃciency of the waiting-line allocation system when individuals diﬀer in both time costs and
personal valuations. Suen’s analysis indicates that an increase in the degree of dispersion in
time costs may lead to a reduction in rent dissipation. Furthermore, transferability and the
introduction of a secondary market for a rationed good may not necessarily improve welfare
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as the total surplus under rationing by waiting depends more on the degree of dispersion
than on the level of time costs and personal valuations.
An important paper on the subject of waiting-line auction was Holt and Sherman
(1982), who formulated the waiting-line auction as a non-cooperative game with incomplete
information. In their model, each participant’s choice problem is to decide whether to join
the queue, conditional on an expected waiting time. Under this formulation of the waiting-
line auction, the optimal choice of the time of arrival at the queue, and thus the expected
waiting time and probability of success, is strategically the same as the selection of an
optimal bid in a sealed-bid tender.7 The approach adopted by Holt and Sherman(1982)
facilitates an analysis of the rent-seeking costs in the waiting-line auction.
2 The Model
There are m identical and indivisible objects to be distributed freely to a group of
n(> m) consumers, at most one object per person, using either the lottery or the waiting-
line allocation rule. The opportunity costs of time of the n consumers (measured by their
wage rates) are denoted by w1, w2, · · · , wn, and their monetary valuations of the objects
(measured in dollars) are denoted by v1, v2, · · · , vn. Thus, the ratio yi = vi/wi describes an
individual’s valuation of an object measured in time units. We shall refer to vi as monetary
valuation and yi as time valuation for the ith consumer.
Consumers are risk neutral. They all know m, n, their own time valuations and
time costs. However, they cannot observe the time valuations and time costs of other
participants. Each participant has identical subjective beliefs about the possible monetary
valuations and time costs of the other consumers. Specifically, each person believes that the
monetary valuations and time costs for the n−1 rival claimants are independent realizations
of a pair of continuous random variables {V,W} having a joint distribution function F (v, w)
with support [v, v] × [w,w], for some finite non-negative v and positive w. The marginal
distributions of V and W are denoted by FV (v) and FW (w), respectively. Similarly, the
marginal distribution of Y is denoted by FY (y).
We compare the eﬃciencies of two allocation mechanisms — the lottery and the waiting-
line auction — using as our measure of eﬃciency the expected social surplus. We define this
as the sum of the expected payoﬀs for all n consumers. We first present the basic analytics
of the two allocation mechanisms.
7see McAfee and McMillan (1987) for an introduction to the auction literature.
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2.1 Lottery
The lottery mechanism operates as follows: at a pre-specified time, m consumers will
be chosen randomly out of the n participants and each of them will be allocated one object.
The probability that the ith customer obtains an object is identical and equal to
HR =
m
n
.
Given the ith consumer’s monetary valuation vi, his monetary payoﬀ is
πR(vi) = viH
R =
mvi
n
.
Given the symmetric treatment of all consumers, the expected social surplus under the
lottery mechanism is
SR = nE[πR(V )] = mE(V ). (1)
Hence, the expected social surplus under the lottery mechanism depends only on the num-
ber of objects available for allocation and the mean value of the distribution of monetary
valuations.
2.2 Waiting-line auction
In a waiting-line auction or queue system, the objects are allocated at a pre-specified
time and location, on a first-come-first-served basis. Each consumer may occupy only one
position in the queue and only one object is allocated to each successful person in the queue.
We assume that individuals who arrive after mth person in the queue will be notified so
that no unsuccessful queuers will waste time in the queue.8 We also assume that the time
for each individual to reach the queue is negligible compared with the actual waiting time.
The equilibrium queuing time. For each individual, there is an optimal (equi-
librium) queuing strategy τ(yi), i = 1, · · · , n, which is a function of the individual’s time
valuation yi. If the individual chooses the arrival time according to the equilibrium queuing
strategy, i.e., ti = τ(yi), his expected payoﬀ will be globally maximized (see Holt and Sher-
man(1982)). In equilibrium, individuals with higher valuations for the objects will choose
optimally to arrive earlier at the queue and wait a longer period of time. This implies that
the function τ(y) is a positive-valued and strictly increasing. Holt and Sherman (1982)
further assumed that it is diﬀerentiable and provided a solution of the equilibrium queuing
time function (their Equation (9)) under a slightly broader setting, which becomes, in our
current setting
8As Holt and Sherman (1982) shows, if losers have to wait, each consumer will reduce their optimal waiting
time, so that in equilibrium, the expected waiting time and payoﬀ for each consumer remains unchanged.
Hence, the results of this paper are not sensitive to this assumption.
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τ(y) =
1
HQY (y)
8 y
y
xhQY (x)dx = y −
1
HQY (y)
8 y
y
HQY (x)dx (2)
where hQY (y) and H
Q
Y (y) are, respectively, the density function and the distribution function
of the mth largest order-statistic among the n− 1 independent draws from the population
distribution of time valuations for the objects. Note that the second part of the equation
follows from integration by parts. Recall that the marginal distribution of Y is denoted by
FY (y). It is straightforward to verify that
HQY (y) =
n−13
k=n−m
w
n− 1
k
W
[FY (y)]
k [1− FY (y)]n−k−1 .
Note that the subscript ’Y ’ indicates that the distribution Y is used.
When all the n consumers choose their waiting time according to the equilibrium
queuing strategy given in (2) above, the probability that the ith consumer will receive an
allocation is simply HQY (yi) (using the fact that τ(yi) is a strictly increasing function of
yi). Holding m and n constant, consumers who possess higher time valuations will choose
a longer waiting time and therefore an earlier arrival in the queue.
The equilibrium expected payoﬀ. The equilibrium expected payoﬀ, in time units,
for the ith consumer, is
πQ(yi) = (yi − τ(yi))HQ(yi) =
8 yi
y
HQY (x)dx
which,upon multiplying the time cost wi gives the equilibrium expected money payoﬀ for the
ith consumer. Finally the equilibrium expected social surplus generated by the waiting-line
auction is
SQ = nE
X
W
8 Y
y
HQY (x)dx
~
. (3)
Note that SQ depends on the joint distribution of time valuation Y and time costW . Thus,
in order to compare the allocative eﬃciency of the two allocation mechanisms, we need to
specify the joint distribution of Y and W . Once this is specified, we can derive theoretical
closed-form expressions for SR and SQ, and compute the ratio SR/SQ.
3 Eﬃciency Comparison: Homogeneous Consumers
We first consider the case of the homogeneous consumers. By this, we shall refer to
a situation where the m consumers belong to the same income class, so that the degree of
variation in time costs is small relative to the monetary valuations. In such a case, it is
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reasonable to treat time costs as the same, i.e., wi = wc, i = 1, · · · , n. With this specification,
we can show that the expected social surplus generated by a waiting-line auction can be
expressed solely in terms of the monetary valuation V = Y wc, i.e.,
SQ = nE
X8 V
v
HQV (x)dx
~
,
where,
HQV (v) =
n−13
k=n−k
w
n− 1
k
W
[FV (v)]
k [1− FV (v)]n−k−1
Therefore, SQ is independent of the actual value of the constant wc. Furthermore, by
switching the order of integrations and then the order of integration and summation, we
can derive
SQ = n
8 v
v
X8 v
v
HQV (x)dx
~
fV (v)dv
= n
8 v
v
X8 v
x
fV (v)dv
~
HQV (x)dx
= n
8 v
v
[1− FV (v)]HQV (v)dv
= n
n−13
k=n−m
w
n− 1
k
W8 v
v
FV (v)
k[1− FV (v)]n−kdv (4)
Thus, SQ depends on the number of the objects to be allocated m, the number of the
consumers n, and the probability distribution of consumers’ monetary valuations FV (v).
The expression for SR remains unchanged, whether consumers have identical or diﬀerent
time costs, as it depends only on the number of objects to be allocated m and the expected
value of the consumers’ monetary valuations E(V ).
In the following sub-sections, we present a set of general results on the relative allocative
eﬃciency (SR/SQ or SQ/SR) of the two allocation mechanisms, under various distributional
assumptions on the monetary valuation V . Common classes of distributions such as power
function, Weibull, logistic and beta are considered. These four classes of distributions cover
the broad range of distribution forms that the monetary valuation could reasonably possess9,
and thus allow us to examine the eﬀect of the distributional shape on the relative eﬃciency
of the two mechanisms. To facilitate the exposition of our analysis, we summarize the
technical results into lemmas, and the qualitative conclusions into propositions (which are
direct consequences of the results of the corresponding lemmas). The proofs of all lemmas
are provided in the Appendix.
9The broad range of distributional forms include L-shaped, U-shaped, J-shaped, flat, unimodal, etc.
Detailed explanations will be provided along the introduction of the results.
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3.1 Monetary valuation with the power function distribution
We begin our analysis with the power function distribution, as this is the only specific
distributional form, to our knowledge, that had been considered in the literature.10 We
present a set of general analytical results that allow for a clear-cut diﬀerentiation between
the two mechanisms.
The cumulative distribution function of the power function distribution has the follow-
ing form:
F (v; θ,β) =
w
v
θ
Wβ
, 0 ≤ v ≤ θ; θ > 0,β > 0, (5)
where β controls the shape of the distribution, called the shape parameter, henceforth. In
particular, the probability density function (pdf) is decreasing (L-shaped) when β < 1,
constant (uniform) when β = 1, and increasing (J-shaped) when β > 1. See Figure 1
for a graphical illustration. The parameter θ controls the range or scale of the V values,
and hence, called the scale parameter. The mean and variance of the distribution are
E(V ) = θβ
β+1 and V ar(V ) =
θ2β
(β+2)(β+1)2
, respectively.
Figure 1
Lemma 1: If consumers’ monetary valuations are drawn from the power function dis-
tribution, the expected social surplus functions associated with the two allocation mechanisms
are SR = mθβ/(β + 1) and SQ = SRh(β, n,m), respectively, where
h(β, n,m) =
n
m
−
n! (βn+m+ 1)Γ(n−m+ 1
β
)
βm(n−m− 1)! Γ(n+ 1 + 1
β
)
, (6)
with Γ(·) being the gamma function. Furthermore, h(β, n,m) satisfies the following: (i) it
is strictly increasing in m, decreasing in n, and decreasing in β; (ii) h(1, n,m) = m+1n+1 ; (iii)
h(12 , n,m) =
3mn+3n+2−2m2
(n+1)(n+2) ; (iv) h(β, n, 1) =
n(1+β)
(1+nβ)(1+nβ−β) ; and (v) limβ→∞ h(β, n,m) =
0.
The h(β, n,m) function in Lemma 1 completely characterizes the relative eﬃciency of
the lottery versus the waiting-line auction. If the function h(β, n,m) takes on values smaller
(greater) than 1, this implies that the lottery mechanism dominates (is dominated by) the
waiting-line auction. It is important to note that h depends on the monetary valuation
distribution only through the shape parameter β. The larger the β, the smaller the h, and
hence the larger is the SR/SQ. It is also important to note that h depends negatively on
10Taylor, et al. (2001) studied the case of the power function distribution, but limited their analysis to
the case where m = 1. They also considered the beta distribution with β = 1 in their numerical analysis.
However, as we shall note in Section 3.4, this is, in fact, also a special case of the power function distribution.
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the scarcity factor m/n. Hence, the smaller the m/n, the larger the SR/SQ. Lemma 1
leads immediately to the following proposition.
Proposition 1: Suppose consumers’ monetary valuations are drawn from the power
function distribution. For any given θ, m and n, the lottery dominates the waiting-line
auction when β ≥ 1. Furthermore, the degree of dominance increases as β increases. When
β < 1, the lottery continues to dominate the waiting-line auction if the ratio m/n is suﬃ-
ciently small (For instance, we can show that h(12 , n,m) ≤ 1 if m/n ≤
1
2).
The intuition underlying Proposition 1, and for the other results in Section 3, is as
follows. First, note that rent dissipation in the lottery occurs only as a result of resource
misallocation. By Lemma 1, SR is increasing in both m and β (since E(V ) in increasing
in β). Since resource misallocation occurs when the m objects may be allocated to a set of
consumers that do not value them the most, the extent of this ineﬃciency, and therefore the
magnitude of rent dissipation, becomes smaller if there are more objects to be distributed
in a lottery. This follows directly from the fact that the probability of a correct allocation
improves as ratio m/n is increased.
By contrast, in waiting-line auction, there is no resource misallocation when time costs
are homogeneous. This is because the optimal waiting time is monotonic in monetary
valuation, so that a consumer with a higher valuation would queue up earlier. The source
of the allocative ineﬃciency in the waiting-line auction is the rent-seeking cost of waiting
in line. Thus, if the rent-seeking cost of the waiting-line auction is higher (lower) than
the resource misallocation of the lottery, the waiting-line auction is the less (more) eﬃcient
allocation mechanism. As given in the formula for SQ, the relative eﬃciency of the waiting-
line auction is measured by the function h(β, n,m). When h(β, n,m) is less (greater) than
1, the waiting-line auction is less (more) eﬃcient than the lottery. There are two factors
governing h(β, n,m): a scarcity factor (through the ratio m/n) and a distributional shape
factor (through β). We consider these factors in turn.
The scarcity factor. In the waiting-line auction, for a given distribution of valuations,
the optimal waiting time τ(vi) of consumer i is a decreasing function in m and an increasing
function in n.11 When there are more objects available to be allocated (a higher m/n ratio),
the intensity of competition is reduced. Each consumer will reduce his optimal waiting time
and therefore arrive at the queue later. Similarly, if there are more consumers competing
for the objects (i.e. a lower m/n ratio), competition will intensify. Anticipating tougher
competition, every consumer will choose to join the queue earlier. Hence, it is no surprise
11The derivation of these results are straightforward, and follow standard analysis in the auction literature.
They are available on request.
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that h(β, n,m) have the opposite signs as τ(v), with respect to changes in m/n. In other
words, the relative eﬃciency of the waiting-line auction, as measured by h(β, n,m), improves
when the m/n ratio rises, and declines when the ratio falls.
The distributional shape factor. The relative eﬃciency of the waiting-line auc-
tion is dependent on the distribution of valuations. A shift in the distribution aﬀects the
optimal waiting time τ(v), and in turn impacts the rent-seeking costs. When β < 1, the
density function of monetary valuation is L-shaped. From the perspective of a consumer in
the waiting-line auction, this means that he is likely to be facing competitors that possess
mostly low valuations. With less intense competition, the optimal waiting time will be small.
As β increases, the distribution of V shifts to the right in the sense of first-order stochastic
dominance. From the perspective of each consumer, this means that there is a greater
likelihood that he will be facing competitors that possess higher valuations. Hence, each
consumer, anticipating keener competition, will revise his optimal waiting time upwards.
This leads to higher rent-seeking costs and is the reason behind the general dominance of
the lottery for the case when β ≥ 1. Quantitatively, the function h(β, n,m) decreases as β
increases, so that the relative eﬃciency of lottery over waiting-line SR/SQ increases.
Proposition 1 indicates that when β ≥ 1, the waiting-line auction is unconditionally
dominated by the lottery, regardless of the m/n ratio. For the case where β < 1, when the
expected social surplus is smaller and the rent-seeking costs (i.e. waiting times) are lower,
the waiting-line auction may possibly dominate the lottery, if the rent-seeking cost is lower
than the resource misallocation cost of the lottery. Hence, when β < 1, the relative scarcity
of the objects (as measured by m/n) becomes a critical factor in the relative dominance
of the two mechanisms. As stated in Proposition 1, when β falls to 12 , the waiting-line
auction will dominate the lottery if m/n is greater than 12 . Otherwise, the lottery remains
the preferred allocation mechanism. In general, if the change in the rent-seeking costs is
larger than the change in the expected surplus, the allocative eﬃciency of the waiting-line
auction deteriorates relative to the lottery.
If the rent-seeking cost is suﬃciently small, and lower than the resource misallocation
cost of the lottery, the waiting-line auction would be the more eﬃcient mechanism.
3.2 Monetary valuation with the Weibull distribution
Next, we consider the Weibull distribution, which is useful, for our purpose, in model-
ing monetary valuation distributions that are (i) extremely positively-skewed, (ii) unimodal
and positively-skewed , and (iii) nearly symmetric. These descriptions correspond, respec-
12
tively, to the cases where (i) the majority of consumers attach very low valuations to the
objects, (ii) the majority of consumers attach low to medium valuations, and (iii) the ma-
jority of consumers attach moderate valuations, with a few attaching very low or very high
valuations. The Weibull distribution thus extends the range of situations for the compari-
son of the relative allocative eﬃciency of the two mechanisms. The cumulative distribution
function of the Weibull distribution takes the form
F (v; θ,β) = 1− exp
X
−
w
v
θ
Wβ~
, v > 0; θ > 0,β > 0, (7)
where β is the shape parameter and θ is the scale parameter. When β ≤ 1, the density
function is a decreasing function. When β > 1, the density function is unimodal with
a longer tail to the right.12 Note that when β = 1, the Weibull becomes an exponential
distribution. The mean and variance of a Weibull random variable are, respectively, E(V ) =
θΓ(1 + 1
β
) and V ar(V ) = θ2[Γ(1 + 2
β
)− [Γ(1 + 1
β
)]2]. Figure 2 provides illustrations of the
density function of the Weibull distribution.
Figure 2
Lemma 2: If consumers’ monetary valuations are drawn from the Weibull distribution,
the expected social surplus functions associated with the two allocation mechanisms are given
by SR = mθΓ(1 + 1/β) and SQ = SRh(β, n,m), respectively, where,
h(β, n,m) =
n
m
n−13
n−m
k3
j=0
w
n− 1
k
Ww
k
j
W
(−1)j
w
1
n− k + j
W1/β
. (8)
Furthermore, h(β, n,m) is decreasing in β and h(1, n,m) = 1.
Proposition 2: Suppose consumers’ monetary valuations are drawn from the Weibull
distribution. The lottery dominates the waiting-line auction if β > 1; the waiting-line
dominates the lottery if β < 1; the two allocation mechanisms are equally eﬃcient when β =
1, which represents the case where monetary valuations follow an exponential distribution.
The results of Lemma 2 and Proposition 2 are rather striking. They show that when
monetary valuations can be modeled as a Weibull distribution, the dominance of the lottery
over the waiting-line auction, and vice versa, depends only on the shape parameter β of the
distribution. More significantly, it does not depend on the scarcity factor, as measured by
the m/n ratio.
12It can be shown that when β = 3.768, the density function of the Weibull distribution is very similar to
that of a normal distribution (See Hernandez and Johnson (1980)).
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While the dominance of one allocation mechanism over the other is completely char-
acterized by the value of β, the degree of dominance still depends on the scarcity factor
m/n. To see this, we plot the relative eﬃciency of the lottery over the waiting-line auction
(i.e., SR/SQ = 1/h(β, n,m)) in Figure 3. From the plot of SR/SQ against β (left-hand plot
of Figure 3) for given m and n, we note that as β increases, the relative eﬃciency of the
lottery over the waiting-line auction improves most rapidly when the ratio m/n is smallest.
As the ratio m/n increases, the curve of SR/SQ flattens, so that when m/n ≈ 1, the ratio
SR/SQ ≈ 1. Next, from the plot of SR/SQ vs m for given β and n (right-hand plot of
Figure 3), we see that the ratio SR/SQ approaches 1 when m approaches n. These results
suggests that when the scarcity of the objects to be allocated is not an issue (i.e. when the
ratio m/n ≈ 1), it does not matter too much which allocation mechanism is used, as the dif-
ference in allocative eﬃciency will likely be small. Conversely, when the ratio m/n declines,
there will be a marked discrepancy in the allocative eﬃciency of the two mechanisms.
The intuition behind these comparative results lie in the fact that as m/n falls, the
scarcity factor forces consumers to raise their optimal waiting time, thereby increasing
the rent-seeking costs of the waiting-line auction. By contrast, the lottery does not suﬀer
from rent dissipation through rent-seeking costs; hence, its dominance over the waiting-line
auction improves when the ratio m/n declines.
Figure 3
3.3 Monetary valuation with the logistic distribution
We include the class of logistic distributions in our analysis for the following reason: in
a variety of economic settings, it is reasonable to approximate the distribution of monetary
valuations as a symmetric distribution. The logistic distribution function serves this pur-
pose, and at the same time enables us to derive closed-form expressions for the expected
surplus functions.13 The cumulative distribution function of the logistic distribution has
the following form
F (v;µ, θ) = 1− 1
1 + exp[(v − µ)/θ] , −∞ < v <∞;−∞ < µ <∞, θ > 0. (9)
Note that the logistic distribution is symmetric around the mean E(V ) = µ with variance
V ar(V ) = 13π
2θ2. Note that µ is a location parameter and θ is the scale parameter. The
larger θ is, the flatter is the pdf. A few plots of the logistic pdf are provided in Figure 4 for
illustrative purpose.
13We chose the class of logistic distributions over the class normal distributions for our analysis, as the
latter class of distributions does not allow us to derive closed-form expressions for the expected surplus func-
tions. With suitable choice of parameters, the logistic distribution may approximate a normal distribution.
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Figure 4
Lemma 3: If consumers’ monetary valuations are drawn from the logistic distribution,
the expected social surplus functions associated with the two allocation mechanisms are
SR = mµ and SQ = nθ[Ψ(n)−Ψ(n−m)]
where Ψ(·) is the digamma function defined as Ψ(z) = d logΓ(z)/dz.
Note that the logistic distribution may assume negative values, which has no economic
meaning for the problem at hand, since an individual with a negative monetary valuation
will not choose to participate in either the lottery or the waiting-line auction. However, we
can make the probability of negative values negligible by having a large mean-to-scale ratio,
i.e., µ/θ ≥ 10.14 Taking µ/θ = 10, we have
SQ
SR
=
n
10m
[Ψ(n)−Ψ(n−m)],
which is an increasing function of m. It can be easily verified that maxm(S
Q/SR) < 1 for
n < 10000. Hence, we can conclude that if monetary valuations follow a logistic distribution,
the lottery mechanism essentially dominates the waiting-line auction.
Proposition 3: If consumers’ monetary valuations are drawn from the logistic dis-
tribution with a negligible probability of negative valuations (µ/θ ≥ 10), the lottery almost
always dominates the waiting-line auction.
This result is particularly striking as it suggests that when the monetary valuations is
modeled as a symmetric distribution and time costs are homogeneous, the optimal allocation
mechanism is almost always a random allocation, regardless of the number of objects to be
allocated or the number of participants.
3.4 Monetary valuation with the beta distribution
The final class of distributions that we shall consider is the beta distribution. The
probability density function (pdf) of the beta distribution has the following form
F (v;α,β) =
Γ(α+ β)
Γ(α)Γ(β)
vα−1(1− v)β−1, 0 ≤ v ≤ 1,α > 0,β > 0. (10)
In terms of the potential shapes of the density function, the beta distribution is the richest
family of distributions. It is U-shaped if α < 1 and β < 1, uniform if α = 1 and β = 1,
14The probability of negative values is F (0, µ, θ) = 1 − 1/[1 + exp(−µ/θ)]. When µ/θ ≥ 10, we have
F (0, µθ) ≤ 4.5× 10−5.
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L-shaped if α < 1 and β > 1, J-shaped if α > 1 and β < 1, and unimodal, otherwise.
Furthermore, when β = 1, the beta distribution becomes a special case of the power func-
tion distribution. The mean and variance of the beta distribution are E(V ) = α
α+β and
V ar(V ) = αβ
(α+β)2(α+β+1)
, respectively. We provide plots of the beta pdf in Figure 5.
Figure 5
As the cumulative distribution function of the beta distribution does not have a closed-
form expression, it is diﬃcult to derive general closed-form functions for the expected surplus
functions of the lottery and the waiting line auction. For the purpose of our study, we have
elected to conduct our analysis in the following manner. First, we consider two special cases
of the beta distribution - when α = 1 and when β = 1 - which allow us to obtain closed-form
expression of the ratio SR/SQ. The analysis of these two cases allow us to obtain a set
of sharp comparative results. Next, for the general case where no analytical solutions are
available, we compute the values of the ratio SR/SQ (using the general expression given in
(4)) for a range of parameter configurations of β, n and m. These results are presented in
Figure 6.
To begin with, note that for the special case when β = 1, the distribution becomes a
power function distribution; hence, the results of Lemma 1 apply. In particular, we conclude
that when β = 1, the lottery dominates the waiting-line auction if α ≥ 1, and if α < 1
it continues to dominate the waiting-line auction provided that m/n is suﬃciently small.
Similarly, for β > 1, the lottery remains the more eﬃcient allocation mechanism. For the
second special case when α = 1, we first prove the following lemma.
Lemma 4: If consumers’ monetary valuations are drawn from the beta distribution and
α = 1, the expected social surplus functions associated with the two allocation mechanisms
are SR = m/(1 + β) and SQ = SRh(β, n,m), respectively, where
h(β, n,m) =
n!Γ(m+ 1 + 1/β)
m!Γ(n+ 1 + 1/β)
. (11)
Furthermore, h(β, n,m) is increasing in β, and limβ→∞ h(β, n,m) = 1.
The implication of Lemma 4 is that when α = 1,the lottery dominates the waiting-line
auction regardless of the value of β, or the ratio m/n. This conclusion can be generalized
straightforwardly to the case when α > 1. The intuition here is that, as α increases from
1, the weight of the pdf shifts to the right, so the distribution shifts in terms of first-order
stochastic dominance. In turn, this means a greater likelihood that consumers participating
in the waiting-line auction possess higher valuations. Thus, competition intensifies in the
waiting-line auction and each consumer will raise her optimal waiting time. Therefore, rent-
seeking costs are higher when the distribution shifts to the right. As a result, the h(β, n,m)
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function decreases as α increases (see Figure 6). Combining Lemmas 1 and 4, and the above
discussions, we can conclude that
Proposition 4: If consumers’ monetary valuations are drawn from the beta distrib-
ution, the lottery dominates the waiting-line auction, except possibly when α < 1, β ≥ 1,
i.e., when the beta distribution is L-shaped, and m/n is suﬃciently large.
Figure 6
3.5 Generalization of results for homogeneous consumers
The analysis in the preceding sub-sections has identified a set of conditions under which
the lottery dominates the waiting-line auction. Let us summarize the results here. For the
power function, the Weibull, the logistic and the beta functions, we note that as long as
the weight of the pdf is not extremely concentrated on the left-hand side, the lottery is
the more eﬃcient mechanism. In fact, when the pdf is unimodal, U-shaped, J-shaped or
uniform, the lottery is the more eﬃcient allocation scheme.
It is only in the case when the pdf is L-shaped that the waiting-line auction may
dominate the lottery. In the case of the Weibull distribution, this occurs when the shape
parameter β is less than 1, independent of the scarcity factor m/n. In the case of the
power function distribution and the beta distribution, the dominance of the waiting-line
auction depends also on a suﬃciently high m/n ratio. When the m/n ratio is very small,
the lottery continues to dominate, as we showed in an example for the case of the power
function distribution. Thus, while the waiting-line auction may dominate the lottery in some
situations, the conditions under which this can occur are very stringent. These conditions
are: a suﬃciently low likelihood of high-valuation individuals participating in the waiting-
line auction, and a suﬃciently large numbers of objects for allocation (relative to the number
of participants) so that the scarcity factor is not an issue.
The intuition here is that when consumers are suﬃciently homogeneous and possess low
valuations, and the ratio m/n is suﬃciently high, the lower degree of resource misallocation
in the waiting-line auction (relative to the lottery) more than compensates for the rent-
seeking costs of waiting in the queue. We summarize these findings into the following
Proposition.
Proposition 5: The lottery dominates the waiting-line auction for all time valua-
tion distributions that are unimodal, U-shaped, J-shaped, uniform, etc., independent of the
scarcity factor (as measured by m/n). The waiting-line auction may dominate the lottery
when the density distributions are L-shaped, provided that the ratio m/n is suﬃciently high.
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4 Eﬃciency Comparison: Heterogeneous Consumers
In the previous section, we analyzed the case where consumers’ time costs are relatively
homogeneous, so that the assumption of identical time costs is reasonable. When consumers’
time costs vary significantly, it is more appropriate to consider a joint distribution for time
valuations Y and time costsW or a joint distribution for monetary valuation V and time cost
W . When time costs and time valuations are correlated, rent dissipation in the waiting-
line auction includes potential resource misallocation as well. We first note a couple of
interesting cases : (i) V and W are independent and (ii) Y and W are independent. Using
the general expression given in (3), some simple conditioning arguments show that when
W is independent of V , all the results of Lemmas 1 to 4 go through. Again, using (3), a
direct manipulation shows that the SR/SQ remains the same ifW is no longer constant but
is independent of Y . This allows us to draw a general conclusion that the heterogeneity in
time costs does not change the relative eﬃciency of the lottery over the waiting-line auction
if time costs are independent of monetary valuations or time valuations.
For the more general case, we present a model of joint distribution between time
valuations and time costs to analyze the impact of heterogeneity on the relative allocative
eﬃciency.15 Our analysis suggests that the relative eﬃciency of the waiting-line auction
in fact improves when there is positive correlation in time costs and monetary valuations,
and deteriorates when the correlation is negative. When the correlation is zero, the relative
eﬃciency of the waiting-line auction is not aﬀected by heterogeneity in time costs.
4.1 Positively correlated time valuation and time cost
Consider the case where Y and W are uniformly distributed on the area A = {(y, w) :
[0 ≤ y ≤ 1], [0 ≤ w ≤ βyβ−1]}. The joint pdf of Y and W is
f(y, w) = 1, 0 ≤ y ≤ 1, 0 ≤ w ≤ βyβ−1; β ≥ 1. (12)
It is easy to verify that fY (y) = βy
β−1, 0 ≤ y ≤ 1, i.e., the marginal distribution of
Y is the power function distribution with the scale parameter equal to 1, and fW (w) =
1− (w/β)
1
β−1 , 0 ≤ w ≤ β. The correlation coeﬃcient between Y and W is
ρ(Y,W ) =
β − 1
2β

(β + 2)(9β − 6)
7β2 − 2β + 4
For β = 1, 2, 4,∞, we have ρ(Y,W ) = 0, 0.32, 0.48, and 0.57, respectively. This shows that
Y and W are uncorrelated when β = 1, and that the correlation increases as β increases
(with an upper limit of 0.57).
15From a modeling point of view, we could consider either a joint distribution of time valuations and time
costs or a joint distribution of monetary valuations and time costs. As our motivation here is to demonstrate
the impact of heterogeneity on relative eﬃciency, we have chosen the current specification for its tractability.
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Lemma 5: When time valuation Y and time cost W are drawn jointly from the
distribution specified in (12), the expected social surplus functions are SR = 14mβ, and
SQ = SRh(β, n,m), where,
h(β, n,m) =
2β
2β − 1
X
n
m
− 1
β
+
m+ 1
2β(n+ 1)
−
n!Γ(n−m+ 1
β
)
m(n−m− 1)!Γ(n+ 1
β
)
~
(13)
Furthermore, h(β, n,m) is decreasing in β, h(1, n,m) = m+1n+1 and limβ→∞ h(β, n,m) = 0.
A direct comparison of the h functions, defined in Lemma 1 and Lemma 5 allows us
to determine the eﬀect of positive correlation of time costs and time valuations on relative
allocative eﬃciency. First, note that when β = 1, both h functions have the same value. This
implies that when time valuations and time costs are uncorrelated, the relative allocative
eﬃciency of the waiting-line auction versus the lottery remains unchanged. Therefore, the
results of Proposition 1 continues to hold even if consumers are heterogeneous in their time
costs. When β tends to ∞, both the h functions are trivially identical, as both h functions
tend to zero.
More importantly, as β increases — causing the marginal distribution of time valuations
fY (y) to become more negatively skewed — the waiting-line auction remains dominated by
the lottery, regardless of the degree of correlation between Y and W . This result follows
directly from Lemma 5 that h(β, n,m) ≤ 1 when β = 1 and is decreasing in β. Furthermore,
it is easy to verify that the degree of dominance of the lottery over the waiting-line auction
increases with β, and decreases with m/n. The set of results indicate that the general
dominance of the lottery extends to the case where time costs are positively correlated with
time valuations.
4.2 Negatively correlated time valuation and time cost
To analyze the impact of negative correlation on relative allocative eﬃciency, consider
the following specification of time cost: W ∗ = β −W .16 Then,
ρ(Y,W∗) = −ρ(Y,W ) = −β − 1
2β

(β + 2)(9β − 6)
7β2 − 2β + 4 ,
i.e., the time valuation Y and time cost W ∗ are negatively correlated.
Lemma 6: If Y and W follow the joint distribution specified in (12), the expected
social surplus functions under the time valuation Y and time cost W ∗ = β −W are SR =
16This specification is chosen for its tractability and does not aﬀect the generality of the results presented
here.
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1
4mβ, and S
Q = SRh(β, n,m), where,
h(β, n,m) =
4β
3β − 1h1(β, n,m)−
β + 1
3β − 1h2(β, n,m) (14)
with h1 being the h function defined in Lemma 1 and h2 the h function defined in Lemma 5.
Furthermore, h(β, n,m) is decreasing in β, h(1, n,m) = m+1n+1 and limβ→∞ h(β, n,m) = 0.
Together, Lemmas 5 and 6 allow us to compare the relative eﬃciency of the waiting-line
auction under the alternative scenarios of positive and negative correlations of time costs
and time valuations. We shall conduct the comparison by way of a graphical analysis, as
provided in Figure 7.
Figure 7
In Figure 7, we have plotted the three h functions (defined in Lemmas 1, 5 and 6),
against m, for a given value of β and for n = 50. The plots in Figure 7 show that when Y
and W are positively correlated, the relative eﬃciency of the waiting-line auction over the
lottery is higher than in the case when Y and W are un-correlated. The converse is true
when Y and W are negatively correlated.
It is important to note that even though the relative eﬃciency of the waiting-line
auction over the lottery improves in the case of positive correlation between time costs and
time valuations, the lottery remains the more eﬃcient mechanism (as noted in the discussion
following Lemma 5) in the model that we present here. We summarize our findings in the
following Proposition.
Proposition 6: If consumers’ time valuations Y and time costs W follow the joint
distribution specified in (12), the allocative eﬃciency of the waiting-line auction improves
(deteriorates) if Y and W are more positively (negatively) correlated, compared with the
case when they are uncorrelated.
Note that since monetary valuation is a product of time valuation and time cost,
V = YW , a positive correlation between Y and W implies a positive correlation between V
and W . Similarly, it is straightforward to show that V and W ∗ are negatively correlated.
A common perception (and argument against the use of the waiting-line auction as
an allocation mechanism) is that less wealthy or financially constrained individuals with
lower ability to pay (i.e. monetary valuations) are also likely to have lower time-costs. The
assertion is that these individuals are likely to join the queue earlier in a waiting-line auction,
so that the objects are not necessarily allocated to those who might possess higher monetary
valuations. The equivalent assertion is that when time valuations Y and time costs W are
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positively correlated, the allocative eﬃciency of the waiting-line auction is lower than when
time costs are uncorrelated (or negatively correlated) with time valuations. Proposition 6
suggests that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the eﬃciency of the waiting-line auction
in our model in fact improves when opportunity cost of time is positively correlated with
monetary valuations.
It would be of interest to consider some more general joint distributions for time val-
uations and time costs. However, in light of the strong results derived in this section, and
combined with the general analysis given in the earlier sections, we believe that although
heterogeneity in time costs may result in an improvement in the relative eﬃciency of the
waiting-line auction over the lottery, the improvement is not likely to be significant enough
to reverse the general dominance of the lottery over the waiting-line auction, unless the
marginal distribution of time valuation is extremely positively skewed (i.e. L-shaped).
5 Conclusion
This paper set out to analyze the relative allocative eﬃciency of the waiting-line auction
and the lottery. By comparing the expected social surplus functions of the two mechanisms,
we are able to delineate the circumstances under which a random allocation mechanism is
more eﬃcient than the waiting-line auction, and vice versa. Our analysis suggests that
when time costs are homogeneous, the lottery is the optimal mechanism in a wide range
of circumstances (Propositions 1 to 5). We also analyzed the case when time costs are
heterogeneous and correlated with time valuations. We are able to show that the relative
eﬃciency of the waiting-line auction improves when there is positive correlation between
time costs and time valuations, but deteriorates when the correlation is negative (Proposi-
tion 6). Our results indicate that besides its equity appeal, the lottery mechanism is also
the eﬃcient non-price allocation mechanism in a wide variety of situations.
While we assumed in our analysis that consumers are risk-neutral and no secondary
market exists, our results continue to hold when these assumptions are relaxed. If there
are no restrictions on transferability, the resource misallocation in both the lottery and
the waiting-line auction can potentially be eliminated, as successful individuals with low
valuations transfer, for a fee, their allocation to those with higher valuations. However,
rent-seeking cost in the waiting-line auction will increase if there are resale opportunities,
as individuals, anticipating keener competition, will choose to arrive at the queue earlier.
It is unclear if the reduction in resource misallocation would more than compensate for the
increase in rent-seeking costs when a secondary market exists.
Suppose consumers are risk averse instead of risk-neutral. As is well-known in the
auction literature (see Maskin and Riley (1984)), it can be shown that the optimal waiting
time, and consequently the rent-seeking costs, will also be higher. Furthermore, if there is
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uncertainty over the number of objects to be allocated and/or and the number of potential
participants (i.e. the scarcity factor m/n is not common knowledge), introducing risk
aversion will also lead to a longer optimal waiting time.
While the analysis in this paper is positive and does not address the issue of equity,
we hope the results presented here will contribute to a better understanding among policy-
makers on the choice of the appropriate non-price allocation mechanism. Clearly, if more
weight is assigned to the welfare (expected payoﬀs) of a particular group of individuals, the
relative desirability of two allocation schemes may not follow the ranking based on allocative
eﬃciency. Specifically, it is conceivable that if it is desirable that the allocation favors, say,
the lower-income group, and time costs and positively correlated with time valuation, then a
waiting-line auction may be the preferred allocation scheme. However, a potentially better
allocation scheme may be to segregate the n participants into two or more groups, based
on income, and conduct separate lotteries for the diﬀerent groups. Relatively more of the
m objects could be alloted to the lower-income group. This meets the objective of favoring
the lower-income group, without incurring rent-seeking costs of waiting in line.
We conclude this paper with a conjecture regarding the applicability of our findings to
contests where rent-seeking costs are significant in determining the outcomes. Specifically,
consider R&D races in which patent rights are granted on the basis of (nearly) completed
invention; this type of R&D race is akin to waiting-line auction for patent allocation. The
competing firms have diﬀerent monetary valuations that they attach to the patent rights
and their cost of entering the R&D race (akin to time costs) may be correlated with their
valuations. If there are only a few patents to be awarded and there are a large number of
competing firms, the level of rent-seeking costs is likely to be significant.
Our results in this paper suggests that introducing an element randomization in the
allocation process may perhaps alleviate rent-seeking costs and improve the eﬃciency of the
R&D race. In an R&D race, technical progress is usually stochastic and the leaders at the
early stage of the invention process may not be the eventual winners. Thus, if patent rights
are awarded at an earlier stage of the invention process, say, to interim leaders, this may
serve to reduce the overall rent-seeking costs. In this sense, the patent allocation process
can incorporate a random element. A completely random allocation of patent rights is, of
course, undesirable in most circumstances since the granting of one set of patent rights may
aﬀect the innovative processes in the future and, consequently, the pace of economic growth.
An important consideration is that randomization in the allocation of patent rights may
reduce the incentives to innovate and aﬀect the rate of invention in equilibrium. Thus, there
is a tradeoﬀ between the potential reduction in rent-dissipation, when a random element
is incorporated in the allocation process, and the dis-incentives that may be created as a
result. This is an important issue for further research.
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Appendix: Proofs of the Lemmas
The proofs of Lemmas 1-4 are basically the derivations of SQ give in (4) in terms of
money valuation V . That is,
SQ = n
n−13
k=n−m
w
n− 1
k
W8 v
v
FV (v)
k[1− FV (v)]n−kdv.
Proof of Lemma 1. With the power function distribution, we have FV (v) = (v/θ)
β, and
SR = mE(V ) =
mθβ
1 + β
SQ = n
n−13
k=n−m
w
n− 1
k
W8 θ
0
[(v/θ)β)]k[1− (v/θ)β ]n−kdv
= n
n−13
k=n−m
w
n− 1
k
W
θ
β
8 1
0
uk+
1
β−1(1− u)n−kdu, (by letting u = (v/θ)β)
= n
n−13
k=n−m
w
n− 1
k
W
θ
β
Γ(k + 1
β
)Γ(n− k + 1)
Γ(n+ 1 + 1
β
)
=
θ
β
Γ(n+ 1)
Γ(n+ 1 + 1
β
)
n−13
k=n−m
Γ(k + 1
β
)
k!
(n− k)
=
θ
β
Γ(n+ 1)
Γ(n+ 1 + 1
β
)
X
β2Γ(n+ 1 + 1
β
)
(1 + β)Γ(n)
−
β(βn+m+ 1)Γ(n−m+ 1
β
)
(1 + β)Γ(n−m)
~
=
mθβ
1 + β
X
n
m
−
n!(βn+m+ 1)Γ(n−m+ 1
β
)
βm(n−m− 1)!Γ(n+ 1 + 1
β
)
~
.
With the assistance of Mathematica, it is straightforward to verify the properties of
the h function stated in the Lemma.
Proof of Lemma 2. With the Weibull distribution, we have FV (v) = 1 − exp[−(v/θ)β],
and
SR = mE(V ) = mθΓ(1 +
1
β
)
SQ = n
n−13
k=n−m
w
n− 1
k
W8 ∞
0
[1− exp(−(v/θ)β)]k[exp(−v/θ)β]n−kdv.
Making a change of variable u = (v/θ)β , and then applying the binominal expansion to
[1− exp(−u)]k, the integral in the summation for SQ becomes
8 ∞
0
[1− exp(−(v/θ)β)]k[exp(−v/θ)β ]n−kdv
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=
θ
β
8 ∞
0
u1/β−1[1− exp(−u)]k[exp(−u)]n−kdu
=
θ
β
8 ∞
0
u1/β−1



k3
j=0
w
k
j
W
(−1)j exp(−ju)


 [exp(−(n− k)u)]du
=
θ
β
8 ∞
0
u1/β−1



k3
j=0
w
k
j
W
(−1)j exp(−(n− k + j)u)


 du
=
θ
β
k3
j=0
w
k
j
W
(−1)j
8 ∞
0
u1/β−1 exp[−(n− k + j)u]du
=
θ
β
k3
j=0
w
k
j
W
(−1)jΓ(1/β)
w
1
n− k + j
W1/β
.
Substituting this back into the expression for SQ, we have
SQ = n
θ
β
n−13
k=n−m
w
n− 1
k
W k3
j=0
w
k
j
W
(−1)jΓ(1/β)
w
1
n− k + j
W1/β
= nθΓ(1 + 1/β)
n−13
k=n−m
k3
j=0
w
n− 1
k
Ww
k
j
W
(−1)j
w
1
n− k + j
W1/β
= mθΓ(1 + 1/β)h(β, n,m).
Since 1/(n− k + j) ≤ 1 with equality occurring only when k = n− 1, and j = 0, the terms
in the summation of h(β, n,m) are thus either constant or increasing as β increases. Hence
h is an increasing function of β. Finally,
h(1, n,m) =
n
m
n−13
k=n−m
w
n− 1
k
W k3
j=0
w
k
j
W
(−1)j
w
1
n− k + j
W
=
n
m
n−13
k=n−m
w
n− 1
k
W
k!
(n− k)(n− k + 1) · · · (n− 1)n
=
n
m
n−13
k=n−m
1
n
= 1.
Note that the first summation is handled by a combinatory formula
k3
j=0
w
k
j
W
(−1)j
a+ j
=
k!
a(a+ 1) · · · (a+ k) , for a W= 0,−1,−2, · · · ,−k.
Proof of Lemma 3. With the logistic distribution, we have
SR = mE(V ) = mµ
24
8 ∞
−∞
FV (v)
k[1− FV (v)]n−kdv
=
8 ∞
−∞
}
1− 1
1 + exp((v − µ)/θ)
]k } 1
1 + exp((v − µ)/θ)
]n−k
dv.
Letting w = {1 + exp[(v − µ)/θ]}−1, the above integral becomes
8 1
0
(1− w)kwn−k θ
w(1− w)dw
= θ
8 1
0
(1− w)k−1wn−k−1dw
= θ
Γ(k)Γ(n− k)
Γ(n)
This gives
SQ = n
n−13
k=n−m
w
n− 1
k
W
θΓ(k)Γ(n− k)
Γ(n)
= nθ
n−13
k=n−m
(n− 1)!
k!(n− k − 1)!
(k − 1)!(n− k − 1)!
(n−)!
= nθ
n−13
k=n−m
1
k
= nθ[Ψ(n)−Ψ(n−m)].
Proof of Lemma 4. When α = 1, the beta distribution becomes FV (v) = 1 − (1 − v)β.
This gives
SR = mE(V ) =
m
1 + β
SQ = n
n−13
k=n−m
w
n− 1
k
W8 1
0
[1− (1− v)β]k(1− v)β(n−k)dv
= n
n−13
k=n−m
w
n− 1
k
W
1
β
Γ(n− k + 1
β
)
Γ(n+ 1 + 1
β
)
=
n!
βΓ(n+ 1 + 1
β
)
n−13
k=n−m
Γ(n− k + 1
β
)
Γ(n− k)
=
n!
βΓ(n+ 1 + 1
β
)
βΓ(m+ 1 + 1
β
)
(1 + β)Γ(m)
, (by Mahthematica)
=
m
1 + β
n!Γ(m+ 1 + 1
β
)
m!Γ(n+ 1 + 1
β
)
The rest of the proof is straightforward.
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Proof of Lemma 5.
SQ = nE
X
W
8 Y
0
HQY (x)dx
~
= n
8 1
0
8 βyβ−1
0
w
w8 y
0
HQY (x)dx
W
f(y, w)dwdy
= n
8 1
0
w8 y
0
HQY (x)dx
W
1
2
β2y2(β−1)dy
=
nβ2
2
8 1
0
w8 1
x
y2(β−1)dy
W
HQY (x)dx
=
nβ2
2(2β − 1)
8 1
0
(1− x2β−1)HQY (x)dx
=
nβ2
2(2β − 1)
n−13
k=n−m
w
n− 1
k
W8 1
0
(1− x2β−1)(xβ)k(1− xβ)n−k−1dx, (letting u = xβ)
=
nβ
2(2β − 1)
n−13
k=n−m
w
n− 1
k
Ww8 1
0
uk+
1
β−1(1−u)
n−k−1
−
8 1
0
uk+1(1− u)n−k−1
W
du
=
nβ
2(2β − 1)
n−13
k=n−m
w
n− 1
k
WXΓ(k + 1
β
)Γ(n− k)
Γ(n+ 1
β
)
− Γ(k + 2)Γ(n− k)
Γ(n+ 2)
~
=
β
2(2β − 1)
n−13
k=n−m
X
Γ(n+ 1)Γ(k + 1
β
)
Γ(n+ 1
β
)Γ(k + 1)
− k + 1
n+ 1
~
=
β
2(2β − 1)
X
Γ(n+ 1)
Γ(n+ 1
β
)
X
βΓ(n+ 1
β
)
Γ(n)
−
βΓ(n−m+ 1
β
)
Γ(n−m)
~
−
m(n+ 1)− 12m(m+ 1)
n+ 1
~
=
w
mβ
4
W
2β
2β − 1
X
n
m
− 1
β
+
m+ 1
2β(n+ 1)
−
n!Γ(n−m+ 1
β
)
m(n−m− 1)!Γ(n+ 1
β
)
~
#
With the assistance of Mathematica, it is straightforward to verify the properties of
the h function stated in the Lemma.
Proof of Lemma 6.
SQ = nE
X
W ∗
8 Y
0
HQY (x)dx
~
= nE
X
(β −W )
8 Y
0
HQY (x)dx
~
= nβE
X8 Y
0
HQY (x)dx
~
− nE
X
W
8 Y
0
HQY (x)dx
~
The first part can be obtained from Lemma 1 and the second part can be obtained from
Lemma 5.
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Figure 1: Plots of pdf of power function distribution: θ = 1.0
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Figure 2: Plots of pdf of Weibull distribution: θ = 10.0
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Figure 3: Plots of SR/SQ vs β (left), and vs m for Weibull distribution
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Figure 4: Plots of pdf of logistic distribution: µ = 10.0
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Figure 5: Plots of pdf of beta distribution
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Figure 6: Plots of SR/SQ vs m for beta distribution, n = 100 for the first five plots and
n = 20 for the last one. The last two plots are based on a few selected points.
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Figure 7: Plots of the three h functions defined in Lemmas 1, 5 and 6: n = 50
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